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FIGHTING FOR HER GATES AND WATERWAYS: 
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF NEW GUINEA IN 
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE1
HANK NELSONFrom the changing perspective of their 
homeland as British colonies, Empire dominion 
and independent middle power, Australians have 
thought variously of eastern New Guinea as a 
place to be Christianised and civilised, a frontier 
that might be a state, well-watered lands where 
Australians could settle and flourish, a territory 
to be transformed into a nation, and a declining 
nation to be resurrected. And always they have 
thought that New Guinea was important to their 
own defence. In pursuit of their various policies 
– to have legal possession, to promote Australian 
settlement, to cut constitutional ties, to ‘enhance 
cooperation’ – they have been concerned about 
their own security. While defence has not always 
been the primary motive, it has always been 
important, and the basis of an argument most 
easily expressed and most likely to win support 
from Australians.
An essay on Australian defence and relations 
with New Guinea illuminates central issues 
in Australian history: Australia’s motives in 
the annexation of eastern New Guinea; the 
development of policies for the Australian 
Territory of Papua; participation in World War I 
and the Treaty of Versailles; White Australia and 
perceptions of the threat of Asian invasion; the 
Singapore strategy and ‘betrayal’; international 
communism, the falling dominoes and West 
New Guinea; the granting of self-government to 
Papua New Guinea in 1973 and independence in 
1975; and Australia’s current re-engagement with 
the islands to the north and northeast. 
It is hoped that the essay will also:
• provide a more comprehensive survey 
of the full period of Australian government 
engagement with New Guinea than is available 
in the opening paragraphs of many reviews of 
foreign and defence policies;
• give a guide to the published and unpublished 
sources;
• draw attention to continuities and change 
in Australian policies;
• make critical assessments of Australia’s 
perception of and engagement with New Guinea 
and the islands to the north and east; and
• contribute to the sort of history that goes 
from past to present and is of some value to those 
involved with current issues.
Papua New Guinea is also central to 
Australians’ collective knowledge about their 
defence and national identity. ‘Kokoda’, one 
of the most recognised and evocative words 
in Australian history, is likely to increase in 
significance with the passing of the last of the 
survivors of the World War I and as Australians 
try to locate the formative experiences of their 
nationality in their own region. In less than 
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twelve months in 2003 and 2004 over 2000 
pages were published on Kokoda.2 Australian 
leaders trying to claim a special relationship 
with Papua New Guinea are as likely to refer to 
Kokoda and the shared experiences of soldiers 
and Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels as to nearly 100 years 
of administrative responsibility. But Kokoda, and 
more broadly Papua New Guinea, as the place 
where Australians fought in defence of their 
homeland and exhibited those characteristics 
that they hope others will see in them, is largely 
outside the scope of this essay.3
ANNEXATION AND THE EUROPEAN 
ENTANGLEMENT
For ten days in November and December 1883, 
elected and appointed representatives of New 
South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, South 
Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia 
and Fiji met in Sydney.4 The ‘gentlemen’ in the 
Convention’s debates and resolutions took the 
opportunity to make one of the first assertions by 
a representative group that Australasian defence 
and foreign policies should reflect Australasian 
interests. In the months before the Convention 
those interests had been expressed across the 
colonies in public meetings and newspapers 
concerned about the fate of Samoa, the New 
Hebrides, the Solomons and east New Guinea 
– those islands and part-islands not yet included 
in empires.5
The public had also debated the levels of 
deception and violence in the Pacific labour 
trade and whether cheap black labour was what 
was wanted in a white Australia. At a meeting 
in the Melbourne Town Hall in July 1883 Justice 
George Higinbotham told an appreciative 
audience that there were ‘elements of the danger 
of slavery in the system’, and just as there were 
people who argued that the slaves in the south 
of the United States were content, so those who 
saw a humane system in Queensland rationalised 
the evils of the labour traffic.6 But, he said, 
stopping recruiters seizing women for the ‘vilest of 
purposes’, island chiefs selling men to recruiters, 
the landing of returned men on the wrong coasts 
and the elimination of violence and deception 
all required effective government in the islands.7 
The thoughtful democrat, Higinbotham, had tied 
white Australia to an extension of empire.
More frequently, citizens at public meetings 
– in Cooktown, Bowen, Roma, Charters Towers, 
Dalby, Ipswich and Ballarat – petitioned that their 
objections to the French sending repeat offender 
criminals to New Caledonia be laid before their 
distant queen.8 Soon, the Australians feared, the 
French would be sending their worst citizens 
to other islands, such as the New Hebrides. 
Already, the Australians said, these vilest of 
French scoundrels had escaped or served their 
time, landed on Australian shores and become 
a threat and a burden. Asked for evidence, the 
Australians said that in the last nine years the 
police had reported at least 247 expirees or 
escapees. And, the New South Wales Colonial 
Secretary, wrote:
Not more than about one-tenth are 
earning an honest livelihood; the others 
harbour with and live upon prostitutes, 
and about one half of them are, or have 
been, inmates of our gaols from time to 
time, thus forming a source of expense, 
annoyance and increased crime in the 
Colonies.9
The widespread and aggressively expressed 
opposition of the Australians to the few French 
recidivists (just thirty-three of them in Victoria) 
was partly because it reminded them of their 
earlier campaigns to stop Britain sending her 
convicts to Australia. Higinbotham had protested 
against the transportation of convicts to Western 
Australia. And it reminded some of them of who 
they, or their parents, had been, or what they 
feared others thought they had been.
The need to control or abolish the labour trade 
and exclude the contaminating French recidivists 
was used by the Australians to press Britain 
to annex the unclaimed islands to the north 
east. But when the members of the Convention 
came to word their resolutions, they said that 
the first reason why Britain should extend her 
empire in the Pacific was to secure the safety of 
Australasia.10 That concern with defence may not 
have aroused the most emotional responses in the 
town halls of the eastern Australian colonies, but 
it was widespread. For the Australian colonists 
the argument was simple. As James Service the 
Victorian Premier argued, the occupation of any 
of the islands by another European power would 
be a ‘standing menace and a source of common 
danger to all of the Australasian Colonies’. In 
the event of ‘European complications’, he wrote, 
an enemy of Britain operating from its island 
base might immediately ‘destroy or seriously 
cripple the shipping trade and commerce of 
these Colonies’.11 At the Melbourne Town Hall 
meeting in July 1883, the Reverend D. Jones 
Hamer warned that while Britain was then 
at peace ‘with the whole world’ there were 
‘4,000,000 of armed men’ in Europe ‘and war 
may break out at any day’. His fellow clergyman, 
the reverend John Rentoul of the Presbyterian 
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colonies were concerned the islands were close, 
the presence of another European power there 
meant that isolation and the British navy might 
no longer protect them in the event of conflict in 
Europe, and the islands were – in spite of the fact 
that the Australian nation was sixteen years from 
formation – a frontier for Australian influence, 
exploitation and possession. It was where an 
Australian nation would play its part in Empire 
and world affairs.
To demonstrate that their resolutions were 
not just rhetoric, the Australasian colonies at 
the Sydney Convention agreed that they would 
share the costs should the Imperial Government 
extend its control in the southwest Pacific. Most 
of the Australasian colonies quickly realised 
that they had few funds and New Guinea was 
indeed a long way away, and soon Sir William 
Macgregor, the first Lieutenant-Governor of 
British New Guinea, found that just three of the 
Australian colonies, Queensland, New South 
Wales and Victoria, were contributing the bulk 
of his revenue. For the Australian colonies, 
the expression of a permanent interest in New 
Guinea in 1883 turned out to be a permanent 
commitment to pay.
AUSTRALIAN TERRITORY: 
AUSTRALIAN POLICY
Once the Australian colonies federated the 
new Australian nation was expected to fund 
and administer British New Guinea. At the first 
meetings of the federal parliament in Melbourne 
in 1901, the question of the future relations 
between Australia and New Guinea was just one 
issue that forced members to define Australia and 
Australians. With the passing of the Pacific Island 
Labourers Act and the Immigration Restriction 
Act and the protecting of local industries, 
parliament decided that Australia would be for 
white settlers, no coloured labour would be 
allowed in, or allowed to stay if already in, and 
protected by tariffs Australian industries would 
pay high wages to its white workers.17 There 
is no doubt that these were the major issues: 
protection versus free trade helped define parties 
and Andrew Fisher, the member for Wide Bay 
and to be Prime Minister of a Labor Government 
in 1908, said that there had been no talk about 
New Guinea during the election campaign: ‘In 
Queensland we had one big question only, and 
that was whether that State was to be the 
heritage of the white or coloured races’.18
church, pointed out that a recent article in the 
London Spectator had predicted that in fifty 
years time the Australian colonies might be one 
Australian nation, and unless Britain acted now 
to forestall ‘any rapacious foreign power’ that 
young nation would one day be ‘fighting for her 
gates and her waterway at New Guinea and the 
New Hebrides’.12
The Australian colonies, led by Victoria 
and Queensland, continued their stream of 
unsolicited advice to push Britain to expand 
her Empire in the southwest Pacific. Where 
the Australian colonies were content with an 
extension of British authority over most islands 
sufficient to exclude other powers and prevent 
outrages, in New Guinea they wanted all that 
was not claimed by the Dutch to be part of 
the British Empire. Their anxiety increased as 
they learnt about German plans and German 
shipping moving in the area, and they seized the 
assurance of Lord Derby in May 1884 that no 
foreign power was contemplating claiming the 
New Guinea coast. When in December 1884 
they learnt that the Germans had planted their 
flag on the north coast they reminded Britain of 
the resolutions passed at the Sydney Convention 
and asked Britain to reject German claims and 
extend British annexation.13 After the Victorian 
Government had reliable information about 
German annexation it telegraphed its Agent-
General in London:
At last the end has come … The 
exasperation here is boundless. We protest 
in the name of the present and the future 
of Australia if England does not yet save 
us from the danger and the disgrace, as far 
at least as New Guinea is concerned, the 
bitterness of feeling towards her will not 
die out with this generation.14
On instruction from his home colony, the 
New South Wales’ Agent-General asked whether 
the German claim to northern New Guinea had 
been made with Britain’s prior knowledge and 
agreement.15 The British government resented 
the suggestions that it had been beaten to the 
punch by the Germans or that it had deceived 
its own colonies. The Earl of Derby, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, explained that his 
government had always listened to the Australian 
Colonies, and because the north and the islands 
of New Guinea lay ‘at a considerable distance’, 
there was ‘no foundation for the apprehension 
that great injury to British interests is likely 
to result from the German occupation’.16 In 
that statement the Earl of Derby demonstrated 
the different perspectives of London and the 
Australian colonies. As far as the Australian 
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Under the motion introduced by the Prime 
Minister and Minister for External Affairs, 
Edmund Barton, parliament was asked to 
accept British New Guinea ‘as a territory of the 
Commonwealth’ and provide 20,000 pounds a 
year for five years to pay for its administration. 
Although they had few funds for any national 
projects, the members decided unanimously that 
they would pay the money. They had little 
choice: Britain made it clear that where the 
‘tax-payer of the United Kingdom has so little 
direct commercial interest’ there would be no 
subsidy from London even if that meant a 
lapse of imperial control.19 The Australians had 
learnt a lesson: British New Guinea was to be 
an Australian cost or it would be neither British 
nor Australian. But the Australians were less 
certain about whether Australians alone should 
administer the area and what constitutional 
relationship should link British New Guinea to 
Australia.
In a major speech on 12 November 1901, 
Barton set out a plan and vision. Under section 
122 of the Australian constitution, British New 
Guinea, Barton said, was to become a territory of 
the Commonwealth. That, as Barton explained, 
meant that the Australian parliament could 
eventually give the territory such representation as 
it saw fit in the Commonwealth parliament. New 
Guinea was not to be a ‘precarious possession’ but 
an area over which the Commonwealth had full 
‘legislative supremacy’; it was part of Australia’s 
acceptance of its responsibility ‘for the future of 
these seas’.20 Asked whether New Guinea would 
be within the area controlled by Commonwealth 
tariffs, Barton said that would not automatically 
be the case but in the future Australia might 
move to ensure the free movement of all goods 
between the two areas. Barton told members that 
‘in view of the long centuries for which … New 
Guinea is to be a territory or, perhaps, a State of 
this Commonwealth’ there was plenty of time 
for Australians to work out details. For Barton, 
the acquisition of New Guinea was just the 
beginning of Australia’s role in the region:
There are parts of the Empire in the seas 
surrounding us which may well become, 
as time goes on, subject to the legislative 
control of the Commonwealth, and this, 
I think, formed part of the hopes and 
aspirations of those who look forward to a 
creation of a federation in these seas…. I 
think that [this] can be best accomplished 
by our acquiring, not aggressively, not too 
rapidly, not with any undue haste, but 
as opportunity and reason might make 
it right and convenient, and without 
disturbing the relations of the Empire to 
outside Powers, parts of the surroundings 
of the Commonwealth in these seas.21
Barton had expressed Australian aspirations in 
the region, but there could have been fewer calls 
for a new nation to build its empire so gently and 
gradually. Barton had also left one fundamental 
question unanswered: was New Guinea part 
of an overseas area that would be governed by 
Australia or was it an area that would eventually 
be incorporated within Australia? Others who 
spoke were equally uncertain whether they had 
within weeks of their first meeting violated that 
convenient founding slogan: ‘a continent for a 
nation and a nation for a continent’.22
John Watson, leader of the twenty-two Labor 
members who generally supported Barton’s 
Protectionists, expressed the misgivings of the 
‘Little Australians’. He could, he said, understand 
those who wanted an Australian ‘Monroe 
doctrine’, but when America had asserted its 
right to exclude external powers from its region 
it had the people, wealth and power to back its 
claim.23 By contrast, Watson argued,
We here in Australia are not such a power as 
America then was. We are a mere handful 
of people, with an immense territory 
within the conﬁnes of the continent to 
administer and develop; and it will call 
forth every resource we can lay our hands 
on to bring the settlement and occupation 
of these lands to a successful issue. If … we 
… are going to undertake the defence of 
all outlying territories … then I want the 
taxpayers to consider where the policy is 
going to land them. I ask the Government 
whether they themselves have considered 
what provision will be required for the 
necessary defences of these outlying 
positions.24
Watson pointed out a basic deficiency in 
the argument of those who said that Australian 
possession of British New Guinea was to prevent 
foreign powers from establishing bases close to 
Australia: the Germans and the Dutch were 
already in New Guinea and the French were 
in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides.25 
Australia was joining them, not excluding them.
Watson’s doubts about Australia’s capacity 
to assert its authority overseas was shared by 
Staniforth Smith. Having entered public life 
as mayor of Kalgoorlie before being elected a 
Senator for Western Australia, Smith had, by 
travel, reading and the social conversations he 
enjoyed, made himself an expert on the tropics. 
In 1903 he gathered his confident judgments into 
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a pamphlet: British New Guinea with a Preface on 
Australia’s Policy in the Pacific.26 Like Watson, 
Smith thought that Australia’s ‘extraterritorial 
aggrandisement’ was ‘premature’. It was, he wrote, 
unwise for Australia to abandon its ‘natural 
frontier’ of the sea, and the acquisition of New 
Guinea had violated the foremost founding 
declaration, ‘that our Commonwealth shall 
remain for all time an inheritance only FOR 
THE WHITE RACES of the world’.27 Just in 
case his readers were unaware of the importance 
of what he was asserting, Smith had ‘FOR THE 
WHITE RACES’ in capitals. In parliament, 
others had pointed to the contradiction of the 
white Commonwealth adding a territory that was 
home to several thousand black residents, but 
that did not lead members to reject New Guinea 
and it did not deter members from claiming that 
Australians would be more concerned for the 
welfare of New Guineans than other present or 
possible colonial powers.28 In spite of Australia’s 
lack of power to project its authority beyond the 
continent, the loss of convenient sea borders 
and a confusion of policies on race, Smith still 
wanted Australia to possess British New Guinea. 
And England was to be persuaded to gain control 
by ‘friendly negotiation’ of those other islands 
now in foreign possession. Australia, he said, had 
to have the ‘buffer states’ of islands. For Smith, 
the islands were Australia’s defence from attack 
from the north: ‘The comatose millions of Asia 
… are being galvanised into life and [Smith again 
resorted to capitals] the PERIOD OF LETHARGY 
is being succeeded by a restless energy’.29 Smith’s 
fellow members of parliament, either because 
they thought it fulfilled an aspiration of a young 
nation or was regrettable but inescapable, agreed 
without a division to accept British New Guinea 
as a territory.
The Australian parliament still had to pass 
an act formally making British New Guinea a 
territory. The legislation changed the name of 
British New Guinea to Papua, set down the way 
the new territory was to be administered, and 
established some broad administrative aims. Most 
important among these was a determination to 
continue the British recognition of Papuan land 
rights. Long delayed in the parliament because 
of the aggressive advocates of temperance, state 
land ownership and land taxes, the Papua Act 
did not pass both houses until 1905 and it was 
not proclaimed in Port Moresby until 1906. 
The prolonged debates on the Papua Act, the 
hope of a new Australian nation to demonstrate 
it was different from Britain, and rumours of 
incompetent and violent officials in British New 
Guinea, all gave Australians the chance and 
the desire to introduce new policies in their 
Papua. Atlee Hunt, head of the newly formed 
Department of External Territories, set out the 
options. One was to do nothing – simply ‘remain 
content with the fact that foreign nations may not 
use the territory as a base from which operations 
against Australia might be organised’. But, Hunt 
pointed out, Australia had a responsibility to 
the ‘inhabitants which cannot be evaded by 
any civilized nation’.30 Hunt recommended that 
Australia:
Encourage the development of the 
country under European auspices by the 
employment of imported capital to be 
expended under European direction, 
employing native labour, and at the 
same time extend the inﬂuence of the 
Government until the whole Possession is 
brought under control.31
Hunt assumed that economic development 
might be slow, but the Royal Commissioners 
who visited Papua after Hunt were far more 
optimistic.
The three royal commissioners, Kenneth 
Mackay (chairman), William Parry-Okeden 
and Charles Herbert, saw land ‘rich, virgin and 
fertile’, streams ‘ever flowing and pure as the 
sources from which they come’, and climate that 
offered ‘no serious risk’ to the health of white 
settlers, and in any case everywhere was close 
to points suitable for restful hill stations.32 Now, 
the Commissioners said, ‘the hour has struck for 
the commencement of a vigorous forward policy’. 
And the coming of white settlers was going to 
be good for Papuans: they were to be woken 
from their ‘lotus-eaters’ dream’ and the idleness 
that came from the change from stone to steel 
and from war to peace. Working for the white 
settlers would save Papuans from their ‘indolent, 
apathetic state’.33
Kenneth Mackay, a keen volunteer soldier who 
had gone to fight in the Boer War in command 
of the New South Wales 6th Imperial Bushmen’s 
Contingent and retained the rank of Colonel, 
had modest expectations for the people of Papua. 
At the Kwato mission he saw that Charles Abel 
had trained men to work as skilled craftsmen, but 
Mackay thought only a few Papuans could aspire 
to such heights. It was for the Papuan to do the 
unskilled work and to render the ‘higher race’ an 
‘affectionate respect’, and in the conveniently 
complementary world that Mackay foresaw, the 
obligation on the white race was to deserve 
respect. But as he travelled across Papua, Mackay 
praised Papuans for one virtue. He had seen the 
Papuan police quickly throw a log bridge across a 
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creek and he had ‘realised how useful such self-
reliant, natural engineers they might be from a 
soldier’s standpoint’.34 After hearing a story of the 
bravery of the police at Tamata on the Mambare 
he wrote that there was no doubt that in Papua, 
Australia had ‘splendid material for soldiers’, 
and then added ‘if led by men they respect and 
love’.35 In their final report the commissioners 
said that Australia would be best able to defend 
Papua if it filled ‘its at present empty acres with 
a white population’.36 But, as it was unlikely that 
Australia would be left in ‘undisturbed possession’ 
of the Territory and the Australian settlers would 
be too few to defend their lands for some years, 
they would need help. How fortunate they were 
to have that help right there in the Territory:
Your Commissioners, having seen the 
splendid physique of the Berindere, Kiwai, 
and mountain tribes, their quickness to 
conform to the requirements of drill (as 
exempliﬁed of the case of the Armed Native 
Constabulary) their splendid capabilities 
as transport carriers (as shown by the fact 
that two men can carry 50 to 70 lbs, slung 
on a pole, resting on their shoulders, over 
practically trackless … mountains…), all 
in their opinion point to the fact that, if 
required, Papua can produce from 20,000 
to 30,000 black troops equal to any at 
present serving in the Imperial Army.37
In support of their argument, the 
Commissioners pointed out that the Germans 
had already sent 150 New Guineans to fight 
for German imperialism in Africa. But, the 
Commissioners stressed, they did not want 
Papuans used overseas: they were to be called 
upon by Australia ‘to defend herself against 
Eastern aggression’.38 Again the commissioners 
had found that what they thought were the 
natural abilities of the Papuans were just what 
white settlers needed. And the flourishing of 
both black and white citizens was important, the 
commissioners said, because the Commonwealth 
had to demonstrate its fitness to rule before it 
could take over other areas from Britain and 
realise its ‘true destiny … [as] the paramount 
power in the Southern Seas’.39
By the time Papua was proclaimed a Territory 
of the Commonwealth on 1 September 1906 
and Hubert Murray began his long occupation 
of Government House (‘a most unpretentious 
bungalow’) in 1907, Australia had radically 
changed its assessment of the place of New 
Guinea in Australia’s defence. Where in 1884 the 
Australian colonies had feared the presence of a 
European power and in the event of war in Europe 
they would have an enemy at the gate, now the 
new Australian nation feared a predatory Asian 
nation looking for space and wealth. Where 
in 1884 they had looked to Britain and British 
naval power, now the Australians themselves 
were accepting complete responsibility for the 
administration and some responsibility for the 
defence of Papua. Australians knew that they then 
had little capacity to project their power beyond 
the continent, but they also wanted to assert that 
assuming authority in Papua was just the first 
step in the realisation of an Australian destiny 
in the region. In accepting Papua as a Territory, 
Australia had raised fundamental questions about 
Australian identity: Would Australia one day 
include Papua as a state and if it did would 
the shape of the map of political Australia be 
forever in conflict with geographical Australia? 
If the defence of Papua was to be secured by 
Australian settlers who employed black labourers 
did that mean that in one Australian territory 
there was to be an economic and social order 
within a white Australia that had rejected Asian 
and Island labourers? Through much of the 
debate of the early twentieth century there was 
a consciousness of race: white Australia now 
saw a threat coming from Asia; white Australia 
had taken over a territory home to over 300,000 
blacks; and white Australians would command 
black troops in defence of Australian territory 
against Asian invaders.
It is not surprising that the commissioners had 
warned of an ‘Eastern’ invader. In 1895 Kenneth 
Mackay had written one of the first Asian 
invasion novels: The Yellow Wave: A Romance of 
the Asiatic Invasion of Australia. Mackay’s novel, 
set in 1954, had the Chinese as the aggressors, 
and so did other fantasies of invasion written 
at the end of the nineteenth century, but as the 
Australians debated their policies for Papua they 
were reminded of changes to the north.40 In both 
1903 and 1906 a Japanese naval squadron visited 
Australian ports, and thousands had inspected 
their ships and watched them march through 
the streets. In between those visits the Japanese 
had destroyed the Russian fleet and inflicted 
a humiliating defeat on the Russians. In 1903, 
just before he left for his first appointment in 
British New Guinea, Murray wrote of the strange 
contradiction in his fellow Sydney-siders: they 
favoured the Japanese over the Russians, but they 
would not let the Japanese settle in Australia. 
Murray predicted that should Japan continue its 
rise as an international power, Australia would 
have ‘endless trouble’.41 The events described in 
the novels exploiting fear of an exotic enemy had 
now to be considered a possibility by Australian 
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that a ‘state of war exists between the United 
kingdom and the German Empire’.45 The very 
circumstances that the Australian colonists had 
feared in 1884 were a reality. Britain was at war 
in Europe and Australia shared a land border 
with the enemy, and that enemy had deep water 
ports, coaling facilities and a wireless station in 
New Guinea and a ‘formidable’ fleet somewhere 
in the Pacific.46 Fearing that the Germans might 
attack the newly opened Port Moresby wireless 
station, Murray asked Melbourne whether he was 
to continue to resist ‘at the risk of bombardment 
of Port Moresby’. Told to fight, Murray called 
upon volunteers among the Europeans to form 
a company of Armed Constabulary and the 
volunteers fortified the wireless station and 
had a few practices before Murray’s instructions 
were changed: in the event of attack he, the 
Armed Native Constabulary, the new European 
Constabulary and any officials likely to be taken 
prisoner were to withdraw inland. They were 
not to use force except in their own immediate 
self-defence.47 Australia accepted that it had 
done nothing to prepare Papuan defences and 
had little that it could deploy immediately. 
There were fewer than 300 in the Native Armed 
Constabulary and they were spread through ten 
administrative divisions; and the white settlers 
that were supposed to fill Papua’s empty lands 
had not arrived. By mid 1914 there were just 
1,186 European residents on Papua, half of 
them in the Central Division.48 The enthusiasm 
stimulated by the change in administration and 
the optimism of the commissioners and others 
had petered out. By 1912, the area of leased land 
being forfeited was greater than the area of new 
leases being taken up, and Murray warned that the 
white population ‘will probably never be large’.49 
The Australians had no white troops; and none 
of the potential force of 30,000 men of ‘splendid 
physique’ identified by the commissioners had 
been trained as soldiers.
The common border with German New 
Guinea was the site of one brief moment of 
anxiety in a world war. In October 1914 Frederick 
Chisholm, one of the two Australian government 
officers at Nepa, the station on the declining 
Lakekamu goldfield, discovered a German patrol 
just two days walk to the north. He sent a 
note telling the Germans that war had broken 
out, German possessions in the Pacific had 
been captured, and he invited them to come in 
and surrender. The Germans left quickly, three 
policemen staying to look after sick carriers. 
The Australian government officers and a few 
volunteer miners made a brief pursuit, captured 
the German police and two carriers and sent 
defence planners. In 1913 an ambitious young 
army officer, Thomas Blamey, the first Australian 
to win entry to the British Staff College at 
Quetta in India, wrote his 10,000 word essay on 
Australia’s basic strategic weakness: in the event 
of Britain being engaged in war in Europe, then 
Australia was vulnerable to an opportunistic 
power in the Pacific taking advantage of the 
absence of the British navy and attack.42 As 
commander of the Australian Imperial Force and 
then as Commander-in-Chief of the Australian 
Military Forces Blamey was to face just that 
situation in 1941 and 1942.
Blamey’s 1913 outline of the danger of Japan 
was only one of several statements by military 
experts at that time. In a broad review of defence 
policy, Brigadier-General J.M.Gordon, Chief of 
the General Staff, gave the same warning about 
Australia’s vulnerability should Britain be unable 
to come to Australia’s aid. Colonel J.G.Legge, 
who was himself soon to be Chief of the General 
Staff did his sums: given the distance of Yokohama 
from Sydney, a Japanese fleet steaming at 12 
knots would be there in 14.5 days.43 
In response to Gordon, in 1913 Murray wrote 
a twelve page report on the defences of Papua. 
He pointed out the obvious: Papua was thought 
to be essential to the defence of Australia but it 
had no military forces or fortifications. If oil were 
found in Papua – and there were then hopes of 
exploiting oil reserves in the Papuan Gulf – then 
the significance of Papua in Commonwealth and 
Empire security would change, but whatever the 
case Murray wanted to raise a force of around 
250 Papuans to serve under white officers. He 
dismissed prejudiced statements that the Papuans 
lacked courage by giving examples from the police 
and, while conceding that the Papuan might not 
make an engineer or artilleryman, he claimed 
that was simply because he had no experience in 
those fields. Murray completed his report with 
a comment on the Papuan policeman Corporal 
Sedu who had chosen to die with his Australian 
officer, John Green, rather than attempt to 
save himself: ‘There are not many Sedus in any 
force whether black or white; but there are just 
as many in Papua as anywhere else’.44 Nothing 
came of Murray’s report, and Murray thought he 
might publish it, but that does not seem to have 
happened either.
WORLD WAR I
On 8 August 1914, Murray responded 
to a radio message and issued a Government 
Gazette Extraordinary to tell the people of Papua 
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them to Port Moresby as prisoners, and there 
Murray had no idea of their status. They could 
scarcely be prisoners of war as German New 
Guinea was already occupied by Australia.50 
VERSAILLES: A WIN AND A LOSS
On 10 September 1919, the Prime Minister, 
William (Billy) Hughes, rose to begin a two and a 
half hour speech to persuade members to approve 
the recently signed Treaty of Versailles.51 Hughes 
had just returned from Paris to a hero’s welcome 
for his aggressive presentation of Australian 
interests. He had rejected having Britain represent 
Australia or having Australia just being one 
member of a British panel, and when Australia 
was given ‘separate and direct representation’ 
that was, he claimed, when Australia was 
recognised as a nation. He had annoyed the 
sombre American President, Woodrow Wilson, 
with his opinionated irreverence but delighted 
representatives of smaller nations who circulated 
exaggerated stories about the ‘Little Digger’.52 
Before the Parliament, Hughes was parading his 
own achievements as well as ensuring Australian 
endorsement of the treaty.
The Treaty of Versailles was, Hughes told the 
House, as long as Charles Dicken’s Pickwick Papers, 
but ‘not nearly as interesting’.53 But it was also the 
‘charter of a new world’, a world that could hope 
for peace. Within that charter, Hughes claimed, 
Australia had been able to ‘maintain those ideals 
which we have nailed to the very topmost of our 
flagpole’, and the one ideal that he nominated 
was ‘White Australia’. To the Japanese who 
were most sensitive to Australia’s rejection of 
the ‘open door’, Hughes said that Australians 
would ‘say … who shall enter and who shall 
not’.54 It was almost the same choice of words 
used over eighty years later by the Australian 
Prime Minister, John Howard, in the election 
following the rejection of the illegal immigrants 
and refugees on the Tampa. The preservation of 
White Australia was, Hughes ‘ventured to say’, 
his greatest achievement at the conference. Also, 
he said he had difficulty making the great powers 
understand that it was ‘necessary for the great 
rampart of islands stretching around the north-
east of Australia’ to be held by Australia or by a 
country in which the Australians had ‘absolute 
confidence’. Hughes fought for the right to annex 
ex-German colonies, and when that was denied, 
he argued for minimum restrictions on Australian 
control. He was most assertive about the need 
for Australia to be able to determine tariffs and 
immigration – New Guinea was to be no backdoor 
to those wanting to undermine Australia’s racial 
or economic policies. In the end, Hughes had 
accepted New Guinea as a C Class mandate from 
the League of Nations and this gave Australia 
the same right to make laws for New Guinea as it 
did for the mainland. The few reservations were, 
Hughes said, of no consequence. They included 
no sale of arms or alcohol to New Guineans, the 
prevention of slavery, no building of fortifications 
or raising of armies except in the immediate 
defence of the territory, and providing an annual 
report to the League.55 As a result of the war and 
the negotiations, Australia, Hughes said, was 
‘safe’.
The Australians had thought that German 
New Guinea should have been theirs in 1884, and 
would have been theirs but for the hesitation and 
miscalculation of the British.56 They thought it 
was part of the destiny of a young nation to assert 
its influence in the nearby islands. And now they 
could claim German New Guinea by right of 
conquest. On 11 September the Australian Naval 
and Military Expeditionary Force had landed 
east of Rabaul, and in brief skirmishes before 
the Australians captured the wireless station 
and forced the surrender of all armed resistance 
on German New Guinea, six Australians, one 
German and thirty New Guinean police fighting 
for the Germans had died.57 The Australians had 
carried out an ‘urgent Imperial service’ and had 
raised the union jack in Rabaul, but they had no 
doubt that they had taken and occupied German 
New Guinea for Australia.58 The Australians 
could also press a moral claim on the Allies for 
the 60,000 Australians who had died in Europe 
and a claim for reparations from Germany for 
Australia’s expenditure in cash and blood. If 
that case of might and right was inadequate 
the Australians thought they could appeal to 
necessity: the rest of the world should accept that 
the defence of their continent was dependent on 
control of the islands.
Once the Mandate had been officially received 
and the military administration transformed to 
civilian in May 1921, the Australians cleaned 
the map of many German names, dispossessed 
and repatriated German planters and traders, 
and allowed German missionaries – after a late 
reprieve – to stay. In the public service and in 
the sale of German plantations, Australian ex-
servicemen were given preference: they deserved 
a nation’s reward and they were the sort of men 
who were most likely to ‘Australianise’ the place 
and be able to defend it in time of emergency.59 
In spite of their confident actions, assertions 
of their right to possess German New Guinea, 
and Hughes’ claims that the mandate had given 
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them all that they wanted, the Australians did 
not own northeast New Guinea. This was clear 
in Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles that set 
out the principles of the mandate system. The 
countries holding the mandates were fulfilling 
commitments ‘on behalf of the League’ of 
Nations; the ‘development’ of people ‘not yet 
able to stand by themselves’ was a ‘sacred trust’; 
and it was the ‘tutelage’ of the indigenous people 
that was being ‘entrusted’ to the governing 
power. All those terms – ‘on behalf of’, ‘trust’ 
and ‘not yet’ indicated something less than 
outright possession and with a time limit. The 
references to ‘development’ and ‘tutelage’ of the 
local population put pressure on the policies of 
the nation holding the mandate.60
The reverend John Burton, soon to be general 
secretary of the Methodist Missionary Society of 
Australasia with its stations in the New Guinea 
islands, warned that Australia was not the ‘owner’ 
of New Guinea, but a ‘Trustee’ and its officers 
were ‘stewards of an estate belonging to others’.61 
P.D.Phillips, lecturer in politics at the University 
of Melbourne, said that the mandate system was 
so fraught with ambiguities it was possible that 
the ‘equivocation’ was deliberate. It was not 
just that Australia did not possess New Guinea, 
but that the number of possible claimants for 
sovereignty could fill an international courtroom. 
The claimants could be the Allied powers who 
had received the territories from Germany, the 
Council of the League of Nations, His Brittanic 
Majesty who had accepted the mandate on behalf 
of the Commonwealth, Australia who exercised 
the mandate, or the mandated territory itself.62 But 
what most disturbed many Australians was not a 
question of legality: it was the transformation of 
the Japanese from distant threat to greater threat 
and neighbour.
From its headquarters in Rabaul, the German 
administration had governed the Island Territory 
of the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands. 
The British had asked the Australians to occupy 
these Micronesian islands as well as New Guinea, 
and the German Governor in Rabaul had, the 
Australians thought, surrendered all islands to 
them. But by the time the Australians had 
recruited a force to take German Micronesia (and 
even printed the postage stamps) the Japanese 
were there. Initially, the Japanese on Yap were 
prepared to hand over control to the Australians, 
but as they waited the Japanese, influenced by 
expansionists in the navy and popular pressure at 
home, decided to stay. Exploiting Britain’s need 
for support from the Japanese navy, the Japanese 
soon had agreement that the islands were theirs 
until the end of the war, and by 1917 Britain 
had further agreed to support Japan’s claim to 
the islands at any peace conference. In spite of 
pressure from Hughes, at Versailles Britain kept 
to its agreement. Hughes, in making his strong 
arguments for annexation and then declaring 
that a C Class Mandate gave virtually all the 
rights of annexation, had guaranteed Japan those 
same rights when it received its mandate over the 
Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands. Suddenly 
the Japanese had advanced to the equator. The 
southern Caroline atolls of Kapingamarangi were 
just 400 miles from Kavieng in New Ireland. 
Where once Australians could have thought that 
the Americans in the Philippines and the British 
in Singapore might protect them, now Japan, the 
one Asian nation with the capacity to project its 
power overseas, was just beyond the horizon.63
Australian fears of Asian aggression were 
no longer just irrational projections of their 
own self-created fears. The Americans were also 
disturbed by Japanese strength and expansion in 
the Pacific, and in 1920 Australia’s senior military 
officers told the government that Japan was 
the ‘only potential and probable enemy’.64 The 
Australian public needed no warning: they were 
already reporting Japanese spies photographing 
and sketching Sydney’s foreshores – perhaps these 
Australians were yet to learn of the propensity of 
the Japanese traveller to record everything.65 To 
curb the Japanese, the Australian government 
invested in its own defence (a surprising policy 
for a country emerging from an exhausting war); 
took comfort from, but had little influence on, 
the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 which 
limited Japanese, British and American naval 
power; and supported the British decision to 
build a major naval base at Singapore. None of 
these were adequate or sustained. The Australians 
did not maintain their expenditure on defence 
and anyway little of it went to the north of the 
continent let alone to the islands beyond; the 
Washington agreement gave America and Britain 
a total dominance in naval supremacy but in the 
western Pacific the Japanese were the major 
power, and the British delayed work on Singapore. 
In 1928 a naval and a military expert, both of 
whom chose not to have their names published, 
assessed the place of New Guinea in Australia’s 
defence. They pointed out that Japan resented 
the White Australia policy, but it was, said the 
naval expert, ‘vital’ to Australia; the Japanese 
had a growing population and seemed to be in 
urgent need of space; and the Caroline Islands 
were the ‘stepping stones’ for an advance to the 
south.66 For any attacking force the great asset in 
New Guinea was its many harbours, all necessary 
for an enemy attempting submarine or naval raids 
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or a major assault. Even if the League of Nations 
placed no restrictions on building bases in New 
Guinea and Australia was prepared to invest 
more in defence, Australia would probably be 
better of if it directed resources to Australia itself. 
A policy of defending just selected harbours in 
New Guinea was pointless as a potential enemy 
had alternatives. If the enemy occupied a New 
Guinea port, Australia could not do much about 
it until the Japanese fleet had been defeated and 
the threat to the Australian mainland had ended. 
The defeat of the Japanese fleet would depend 
on the British deploying major forces in the area. 
If the British were entangled in Europe and the 
Singapore base rendered ineffective then the
Commonwealth itself would be liable 
to attack … And in such circumstances 
it would be most unwise to utilise any 
substantial portion of our forces in a vain 
attempt to provide for the local security of 
the large number of scattered islands and 
harbours which exist in the Territory.67
A matter-of-fact assessment, it nominated a 
threat and the circumstances in which it might 
be reality. The islands that Australians said 
that they had to possess to secure their own 
defence were beyond the capacity of Australians 
to defend. Australia’s ‘barrier’, ‘ramparts’ and 
‘sentinel’ islands were also an enemy’s stepping 
stones. One question divided Australians: was an 
attack a distant possibility or a probability?
Australia had one outstanding expert on 
Australian defence and Japan, Edmund Piesse, 
graduate in science and law from the University 
of Tasmania and maths student at Cambridge. 
Appointed to the newly created Australian 
Intelligence Corps in 1909, he was immediately 
involved in assessing the Japanese threat. He 
continued to be worried about Japanese intentions 
through World War I, learnt Japanese so that he 
could read Japanese newspapers, and as Director 
of Military Intelligence wrote detailed studies of 
Japanese imperial ambitions. Piesse was a strong 
advocate of Australia having its own sources 
of information on which to base its foreign 
policy and in 1919 he himself was appointed 
head of the new Pacific Branch in the Prime 
Minister’s Department. But from 1919 he began 
to change his views, suggesting that Australia 
modify its White Australia Policy so that it did 
not fuel Japanese resentment, and after visiting 
Japan he decided that Australia was of marginal 
interest to the Japanese. Having little impact on 
government policy, Piesse resigned at the end of 
1923. Of those informed about Japan, Piesse had 
made the strongest statement about the benign 
aims of the Japanese, but others in government 
and in the military believed that the Japanese 
fleet was then a distant rather than immediate 
threat.68
THE SINGAPORE STRATEGY
As the Australians prepared their delegation 
for the 1937 Imperial Conference in London, they 
reassessed their increasingly dangerous world.69 
The United States, having announced that it 
would give independence to the Philippines, 
had signalled a change to the map to the north. 
Although the transfer of power might not take 
place for another eight years, Australians had 
to accept that the American barrier between 
themselves and Asia was to be diminished. Even 
if the United States retained Guam and Wake, 
those islands were lightly defended and isolated, 
and the Australians could not know if and in what 
circumstances the United States would guarantee 
the defence of an independent Philippines. Japan 
had demonstrated that it would use force to 
expand by attacking Manchuria in 1931; it had 
withdrawn from the agreements limiting its navy 
and refused to answer questions about whether 
it was building fortifications in its Mandated 
Islands; its government was increasingly under 
the control of the militarists and fascists; some 
Japanese openly advocated a ‘southward advance’; 
and Japan and Germany had signed a pact, 
‘allegedly against Communism’.70 Piesse, still out 
of government, wrote warnings that the Japanese 
government and its policies had changed, making 
Japan an immediate threat, and that Australia 
should look to its own resources for its defence.71 
At the same time Germany had proclaimed Hitler 
as Fuhrer, retaken the Rhineland, ‘was rearming 
at full speed’, and – of particular concern to 
the Australians – was talking about reclaiming 
lost colonies. In making the case to keep New 
Guinea, Sir George Pearce, the Minister for 
External Affairs, went back to 1883, pointed 
out the Australian forces had got rid of the 
‘menace’ in 1914, and if the Germans returned 
there would be the added dangers to Australia 
because of the development of aircraft.72 In the 
Senate, Pearce was explicit: the ‘inviolability 
and integrity of our Australian territories is as 
much one of the cardinal aims of our people as 
is the White Australia policy’.73 In 1935 in an 
unusually prolonged tactical exercise, Australian 
army officers gathered and committed their forces 
against an imagined major attack by ‘Northland’ 
on the east coast; the Australian troops with few 
and obsolete arms and supplied by horse-drawn 
carts were found inadequate.74
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In spite of a resurgent Germany and an 
aggressive Japan, the Australians were not as 
alarmed as over forty of years of self-warning 
should have made them. But they did go to 
the Imperial Conference with questions that 
they wanted answered: these concerned the 
aims of the British Empire in the event of war 
with both Japan and another ‘first-class power’, 
the security of the Singapore base, the chances 
of Japan being able to mount a major assault 
before Singapore was completed in 1942, and the 
‘validity of the assumption’ that in the event of 
war in the Far East the British Main Fleet would 
arrive at Singapore within forty-two days.75 The 
Australians were not going to London to meet 
the British as equals. They conceded that the 
British with their diplomatic and intelligence 
services had more sources of information, and 
they almost acknowledged the more doubtful 
proposition that British senior officers knew 
more about conducting a modern war; but the 
Australians had their interests to pursue and 
they did not necessarily coincide with British 
interests.
Before a sub-committee of British ministers 
and the British heads of the armed services, 
Sir Archdale Parkhill, Australian Minister for 
Defence, pressed his questions. He particularly 
wanted to know how long Singapore could 
hold out against a ‘full scale frontal attack by 
the Japanese’. In the face of general assurances, 
he asked for a definite period. He pointed out 
that if Singapore could not hold out for more 
than seventy days then Australia would have to 
change its defence policy and concentrate on the 
development of those services most able to defend 
the continent. He also wanted precise answers on 
whether there were any circumstances in which 
an inadequate British Fleet would be sent to 
support Singapore. He was told that Singapore 
had the stores and the military strength to hold 
on and the fleet would arrive in time. Admiral 
of the Fleet, Lord Chatfield, gave his confident 
summary:
Singapore could be regarded as a ﬁrst-class 
insurance for the security of Australia. If, 
however, he were to be asked whether 
Singapore was 100 per cent. secure or only 
99.1 per cent. it would be impossible to 
give a categorical answer.76
Parkhill continued his persistent search for 
assurance and Sir Cyril Deverell, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, supported his naval 
colleague with the assertion that ‘all our plans were 
based upon the fortress holding out’. Parkhill said 
he was ‘satisfied’ and the sub-committee ended its 
meeting with a statement from the British that 
all the planned improvements to the defences of 
Singapore would be finished by 1940.77
As war came closer, Australian actions were 
based largely on the assumption that Singapore by 
its very existence would deter the Japanese, and if 
it was attacked, it could hold until sufficient of the 
British fleet arrived to turn the tide. Australia did 
not direct resources to the defence of Australia 
and its territories, and after war broke out in 
Europe in 1939 it committed most of its trained 
forces to Europe and the Middle East. But many 
Australian military officers, politicians and public 
servants had doubts about Singapore’s strength 
and Britain’s capacity to reinforce the island 
in all contingencies. Churchill gave Menzies 
what appeared to be his strongest guarantee of 
Australian security in the often quoted cablegram 
of 12 August 1940:
If, however, contrary to prudence and self-
interest, Japan set about invading Australia 
or New Zealand on a large scale, I have 
explicit authority of Cabinet to assure you 
that we should then cut our losses in the 
Mediterranean and proceed to your aid, 
sacriﬁcing every interest except only the 
defence position of this island on which 
all depends.78
Soon after, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Far East, was in 
Australia giving a completely false assessment 
of British strength in Singapore. The Japanese 
fighter aircraft, he said, were not as good as the 
Buffalo Brewster and the Japanese pilots not as 
well trained as the British. He repeated what 
he said was Churchill’s assertion: ‘We will not 
let Singapore fall’.79 The Australians remained 
sceptical. Singapore had not been built, equipped 
or manned as they had hoped, and a British 
promise to come to the aid of Australia in the 
event of a ‘large scale’ invasion was of little 
value. An enemy would only be in a position to 
make such an invasion after it had secured all the 
islands and seaways to the north. It was a promise 
to help when it was too late. In London in April 
1941, Frederick Shedden, the Secretary of the 
Defence Department, told Robert Menzies, the 
Australian Prime Minister, that for too long the 
Australians had accepted the ‘general assurances’ 
and that the claims about being able to relieve 
Singapore did ‘not look very assuring’.80
While those charged with the defence of 
Australia committed themselves without faith to 
the Singapore shield, those Australians in Papua 
and New Guinea had no doubt they were at risk. 
In Port Moresby, Hubert Murray repeated his 
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predictions of a Japanese attack. During World 
War I he reported Australian concerns about 
growing Japanese strength, Japanese resentment 
of the White Australia policy and Britain’s failure 
to support Australian interests.81 At the end of 
1919 he wrote to his brother with characteristic 
cynicism and pessimism from Port Moresby:
Our trouble here is the approaching war 
with Japan, which is to take place in 1921. 
Some think Great Britain will not help 
us, in which case I trust that we may go 
down ﬁghting – but of course we can not 
win…. The naval people seem to think it 
very doubtful if we can win even with the 
British ﬂeet.82
In his private correspondence with his 
family he kept reminding them that Japan was a 
‘constant nightmare’, it would make ‘short work 
of Australia’, his ‘fear of Japan swallows up any 
other anxiety’, Britain would not fight Japan 
over Papua, and in 1939 on the eve of war with 
Germany he was up to his ‘neck’ preparing for a 
‘Japanese invasion’.83 
In New Guinea the Administrator, Sir Walter 
McNicoll, guided an ordinance through the 
Legislative Council so that the administration 
could prevent the Japanese from setting up a new 
shipping line linking several New Guinea ports to 
Japan.84 From 1937 government officers reported 
that the Japanese ships, Caroline Maru and 
Takachiko Maru, carried little cargo, called at ports 
where they neither loaded nor unloaded, and the 
crews were seen taking photographs, measuring 
depths, visiting aerodromes and buying maps and 
handbooks. In Rabaul, the Australians thought 
they saw Japanese naval officers, pretending to 
be merchant seamen and gathering intelligence.85 
The Government Secretary, Harold Page, when 
acting as administrator, warned that there were 
thirty-six Japanese then living in New Guinea 
and every one was a ‘potential intelligence officer 
for Japan’.86
What was happening – or suspected to be 
happening – just over the horizon from Manus 
and New Ireland added to Australian worries. The 
Japanese population in Micronesia had increased 
from 3670 in 1920 to 60,000 in 1938, the islands 
were being ‘Japanised’ by promoting the Japanese 
language and excluding all foreigners from 
trade, and after withdrawing from the League of 
Nations, Japan had further ‘jealously closed’ the 
islands.87 The Australians knew that Truk was 
being developed as a military base, but to what 
extent they were uncertain, and in 1938 Major-
General John Lavarack, Chief of the General 
Staff, told the government that the Japanese 
appeared to be developing offensive bases in 
the Carolines, including one at Kapingamarangi 
where there were said to be military personnel, a 
wireless station, and a coal dump.88
Australians not holding government office 
expressed their fears with more force and prejudice. 
E. George Marks in his 1933 paperback wrote 
that Australia, ‘lonely sentinel in the Pacific, 
the envy of Asia’s seething millions’ would face 
a ‘race war’.89 The title of his book, Pacific Peril 
or ‘Menace of Japan’s Mandated Islands’, and its 
cover with the rays of Japan’s rising sun shining 
on Australia, was indicative of its content. The 
Rabaul Times warned its readers of Japan’s plans 
to expand south and the magazine of the island 
planters and traders, the Pacific Islands Monthly, 
was blunt and frequent in its claims of Japan’s 
territorial ambitions. In 1936, it said that soon 
the Japanese would extricate themselves from 
the war in China and ‘turn south into the 
Pacific’. The west then had three options in 
its policies towards Japan: remain constantly 
armed and on guard, help the Japanese solve 
their trade and population problems, or go to 
war and ‘exterminate the Japanese’.90 In February 
1942, after the Japanese were already in Rabaul, 
Pacific Islands Monthly claimed rightly and 
righteously that it was ten years since it ‘foresaw 
this imminent Asiatic swarming and southwards 
thrust’, and it continued to see the war – as it saw 
much of the island world – in terms of race. The 
Japanese, it said, were ‘imbued with a quenchless 
hatred of our white skins and European culture’.91 
(The peoples of Manchuria, occupied in 1931, 
and China, attacked in 1937, may have found 
these references to ‘Asiatic’, and Japan’s peculiar 
venom towards whites as hard to justify.)
By the end of the 1930s, the Australians in 
Rabaul were divided about whether Japan or 
Germany was the immediate threat. Perhaps 
it was the fact that so many of them occupied 
houses, places of business and offices that were 
recently built and used by Germans that made 
them sensitive to the claims of the strident but 
distant German nationalists. They feared that 
appeasers in Westminster or Geneva might force 
a compliant Australian government to placate 
Germany by agreeing to return New Guinea to its 
previous masters. They applauded the statements 
by Sir George Pearce that New Guinea was 
an integral part of Australia, and in 1938 they 
were reassured by the populist statements of 
Billy Hughes, then Minister for External Affairs, 
who said that handing colonies to Germany 
would be ‘like giving a snack of sandwiches to a 
hungry tiger’, and in Rabaul in the shadow of the 
smoking cone of Matupit volcano he proclaimed, 
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‘On this rock we have got our Mandate … and 
all hell is not going to take it away from us … 
what we have we hold’.92 Prime Minister Joseph 
Lyons might not have been pleased with Hughes’ 
language or timing (it was just after Neville 
Chamberlain thought he might have obtained 
peace in our time), but he wrote to Dr R. Asmis, 
the German Consul-General in Sydney, assuring 
him that the ‘principle underlying’ the Minister’s 
statement was in accord with government policy.93 
Still the citizens of Rabaul needed assurance. At 
a public meeting, 300 white residents supported 
petitioning the King and the Australian and 
British parliaments to prevent the return of New 
Guinea to Germany. They had no doubt where 
sovereignty lay: the Germans, they argued, had 
ceded the colonies to the victors and the League 
had ‘nothing whatever’ to do with it.94
The Australians in Rabaul were right to 
be worried about Australia’s legal right and 
military capacity to hold New Guinea. In 1939 
a committee chaired by Sir Fred Eggleston 
visited the territories as part of its enquiry into 
whether Papua and New Guinea should be 
amalgamated. In its report to parliament it said 
that ‘when the inhabitants of New Guinea are fit 
for independence, the Commonwealth must be 
prepared to give it to them’.95 They went further 
and said that when New Guinea was ready for 
independence the people of Papua would be 
equally ready and ‘if independence is given to 
one it cannot be denied to the other’.96 Murray 
disagreed, saying that in Papua the ‘ultimate 
fate of the natives is as part of an Australian 
state’.97 As war with Germany was declared in 
September 1939 the constitutional destiny of the 
Australian territories was still uncertain: Papua 
might or might not be on its way to becoming 
an Australian state, and New Guinea was still 
thought by some to be forever Australian and by 
others to be on the road to independence. In 1939 
that road was so long that few then alive thought 
they would see its end. Murray agreed that it 
might seem ‘ridiculous’ that New Guinea would 
ever be ready for independence but he pointed 
out that ‘we contemplate the independence of 
the Philippines, and in a hundred years the New 
Guinea natives might easily be the equal of the 
Philippinos of to-day’.98
By September 1940, the war in Europe had 
gone from phoney to Blitzkrieg, Dunkirk, the 
Battle of Britain and the London Blitz. Britain 
was fighting desperately for survival, and sea, 
land and air battles were developing in the 
Mediterranean. Japan’s government was fascist, 
dominated by the military, ready and equipped 
for bold, aggressive expansion, and it was taking 
advantage of the collapse of the French to move 
further south into Indo-China. For Australia 
this was the realisation of their worst fears, fears 
they had expressed for over thirty years. The 
Singapore base was not as strong as planned, 
Britain was unable to provide more than token 
reinforcements, and Australia’s defence strategy 
depended on a commitment to Britain, and 
Britain being able to respond should Australia 
itself be under threat. It was not merely a case of 
an Asian nation taking opportunistic advantage 
of conflict in Europe: from September 1940 the 
Japanese had joined Germany and Italy in the 
Tripartite Pact, committing Germany and Italy 
to support Japan’s leadership of the ‘new order’ in 
East Asia.99 And in New Guinea there was still a 
real German presence, and it was exaggerated by 
the suspicious Australians. In mid 1939 there were 
1000 Germans and Austrians in Australian New 
Guinea, easily the most numerous group after 
the 3,500 British (Australians, New Zealanders 
and Britains) and 1700 Chinese. Among the 689 
missionaries working in New Guinea, 438 were 
German or Austrian.100 The Australians knew 
that some of the Germans in New Guinea were 
Nazis supporters, suspected that in Lutheran and 
Catholic mission areas they were telling New 
Guineans the Australians would soon be gone, 
and thought that in the event of an attack the 
enemy would have ready access to guides and 
interpreters.101 McNicoll also sent reports to 
Canberra that German missionaries might be 
sending weather reports to the German navy, 
receiving mysterious boxes that could contain 
arms, and building airstrips where they not 
needed to serve the mission.102 
The extent to which the Australians had 
acted contrary to self-interest by committing 
themselves to the Singapore strategy was obvious. 
By the end of 1941 they had over 100,000 fully 
trained and equipped servicemen overseas and 
almost none at home. They had almost no 
frontline bombers or fighters in Australia, and 
if they were to use what ships and troops they 
could muster for defence of the homeland, they 
would operate largely without air support. On the 
evidence of what had so far happened in World 
War II that was going to make success – or survival 
– on land or water very difficult. Little had been 
done to deploy troops or build fixed defences in 
north Australia. In Darwin in 1936 there was a 
garrison of eighty-eight men and 4 six-inch guns 
– a greater calibre was required. Early in 1939, 
the 231 strong Darwin Mobile Force arrived and 
just as war broke out in Europe a RAAF squadron 
equipped with obsolete aircraft began operating 
from the civil airport. No significant fighting 
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ships were stationed in Darwin and facilities were 
limited.103 There was slight change in the Darwin 
defences in the first year of the war. Less had been 
done in Port Moresby and Rabaul. In February 
1939 Major Kenneth Chalmers arrived in Port 
Morebsy and by March he had about forty men 
of the 13th Heavy Battery erecting two six inch 
guns on Paga Point. After four months they had 
their guns in place, and by then the artillery had 
entered a cricket team in the local competition, 
bringing the total of competing teams to four.104 
After fifty-five years of British and Australian 
control of a territory said to be essential to their 
defence, the Australians had deployed their first 
unit to Papua.
Major Chalmers and Captain K.Travers 
almost immediately asked to be able to recruit 
Papuans into the Heavy Battery. Murray, who 
in 1913 had suggested establishing a Papuan 
unit, supported the gunners. At the end of 1939, 
the first Papuans – at lower rates of pay – were 
enlisted into an Australian army unit. That 
decision led directly to the formation of the first 
company of the Papuan Infantry Battalion in 
mid-1940. At the end of 1940, the PIB had a 
strength of 6 white officers and NCOs and about 
130 Papuans.105 There was some development 
of the Seven Mile airfield (later Jackson’s) and 
flying boat and naval facilities in the Harbour, 
but until the arrival of a company of the poorly 
trained 49th battalion in July 1940 and the rest 
of the battalion in March 1941, the battery, the 
PIB, the Royal Papuan Armed Constabulary 
(380 men spread through the Territory) and 
what white volunteers could be mustered were 
Port Moresby’s only defenders. At the time of 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour there were 
about 1000 lightly equipped and under-trained 
Australian servicemen in Papua.
In Rabaul there were plans but little 
implementation. The 1937 ‘Blue Book’ plan and 
the ‘Z’ scheme drafted by Colonel John Walstab, 
superintendent of police, were designed to draw 
on New Guinea’s own resources and included a 
New Guinea Native Infantry Regiment with an 
establishment of over 3000, the raising of labour 
units, the deployment of the police and the 
calling up of white citizen forces.106 In contrast 
to Papua, in New Guinea the Australians could 
not bring themselves to arm New Guineans. 
The Australians were inhibited by the terms 
of the Mandate, and even when the League 
was obviously of no relevance, they were still 
unwilling to train and arm large numbers of New 
Guineans for war. As the Japanese landed in 
Rabaul, one of the last acts of some Australian 
field officers was to disarm their police – others 
took independent action to continue to work 
alongside their armed police.
The first Australian troops arrived in Rabaul 
in March and April 1941, and Rabaul, too, got its 
2 six-inch guns. By the end of 1941, there were 
around 1,400 Australian troops in and around 
Rabaul, small numbers of Independent troops 
on Manus, New Ireland and Bougainville and an 
RAAF squadron with ten aircraft (six Wirraways 
and four Hudsons) of slight offensive capacity 
at the Lakunai and Vunakanau airfields on the 
Gazelle Peninsula. Of the plans for local defence, 
all that existed was the New Guinea Volunteer 
Rifles, numbering about eighty men at Rabaul 
and several hundred in the Morobe District, and 
the coastwatching service.107
When the decision was made to put the six 
inch guns on Rabaul’s Praed Point, they were 
intended to protect the town from a German 
raider. At the end of 1939, the immediate threat 
to Rabaul was thought to be an attack by a 
ship or ships, perhaps carrying a reconnaissance 
aircraft and supporting a landing party of 200-
600. All would be gone inside forty-eight hours. 
To meet the marauding ships, the Australians 
could then marshall the New Guinea Volunteer 
Rifles and nearly 400 police (including bandsmen 
and recruits) equipped with rifles and two maxim 
guns which on the sounding of an alarm were 
to be mounted on a utility.108 The possibility of 
German raider bombarding or briefly occupying 
the town was not unreasonable. At the end 
of 1940 the Komet, Orion and the supply ship 
Kumerland, had sunk ships off New Zealand, 
fired on Nauru and landed over 500 captured 
crew members and passengers on Emirau off 
New Ireland.109 But even before the guns had 
arrived at Rabaul, the Australians knew that 
the Japanese were likely to mount a much 
greater attack. In August 1940 the Australian 
assessment from its Northern Command was that 
if Japan entered the war Rabaul could expect the 
‘heaviest scale of attack’.110 In an appreciation 
made in February 1941 the Commandant of 
the 8th Military District (including Papua and 
New Guinea) speculated whether the ‘potential 
enemy, JAPAN,’ would launch isolated raids 
by cruisers of disguised merchantmen or attack 
main centres as a preliminary to holding all of 
Papua and New Guinea. But decided that Japan 
was most likely to make an ‘attack by all arms 
on suitable ports which could be used as bases 
for operations against AUSTRALIA’. 111 In April 
1941, three weeks after he landed in Rabaul and 
before most of his troops had arrived, Howard 
Carr, commander of the 2/22nd battalion, wrote 
that there was still a chance of a raider shelling 
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the town, but if Japan entered the war he would 
face a force ‘vastly superior in strength to [his] 
own’.112 In May, Northern Command warned 
of the speed and efficiency of Japanese landings 
in China – an observation that had already 
appeared in other appreciations – and said that 
by establishing bases in the islands Japan might 
attempt to isolate Australia. The predictions 
about the strength and intent of the Japanese 
forces were becoming more precise – and more 
accurate.113
Australia had moved to enlist the United 
States in its defence of New Guinea before 
Prime Minister John Curtin made his New Year 
statement that ‘Without any inhibitions of any 
kind I make it quite clear that Australia looks to 
America, free of any pangs as to our traditional 
links or kinship with the United Kingdom’.114 In 
October 1941, Curtin as Minister for Defence Co-
ordination had taken a proposal to cabinet. The 
previous government, he said, had considered 
plans for the United States to contribute to 
the development of Rabaul by supplying more 
coastal, anti-aircraft and machine guns. For its 
part Australia was to provide another 1600 
men, doubling their commitment to Rabaul, 
and both nations were to build Rabaul as a base 
from which the United States could operate 
‘against the Caroline Islands and Japanese lines 
of communication’.115 The initial plans had 
been delayed while Rabaul’s security against the 
smouldering Mautipit volcano was assessed. Now 
it was decided to go ahead. After the Japanese 
attacked Pearl Harbour, the Australian naval 
board reconsidered the proposal and decided 
that Rabaul was ‘too exposed for our slender 
resources’ and the ships already at sea carrying 
equipment were diverted.116 The attempt to build 
an alliance between Australians and Americans 
in New Guinea had come to nothing: Rabaul was 
to be the strongest of the Japanese bases in the 
southwest Pacific. 
After the Hudsons and Wirraways of 24 
Squadron arrived at Rabaul in December 1941 the 
purpose of the force at Rabaul was to protect an 
‘advanced observation line’.117 On 18 December 
a Hudson from the ‘upper drome’ (Vunaknau) 
left on a bombing and reconnaissance flight 
of Kapingamaringi and on the same day two 
Japanese aircraft flew a reconnaissance flight 
over Rabaul. Other demanding long-range flights 
left – or staged through – Rabaul, but when the 
Japanese increased their bomber and fighter raids 
in January, the out-numbered and out-moded 
Australian aircraft were, as Squadron Leader 
W.D.Brookes reported, ‘wiped out for all practical 
purposes’. Just three aircraft were in a condition 
to be flown out on the 21 and 22 January 1942, 
and most of the airmen were lifted off the east 
coast of New Britain by flying boat or ship.118
In one year the plan for the defence of 
Rabaul had gone through several sharp changes. 
It had started with local New Guinea Volunteer 
Rifles, the armed police and maxim guns on 
utilities prepared to meet a landing party from 
a raider; the 2 six-inch guns and garrison had 
strengthened the force against raiders but from 
arrival had to deploy to meet an overwhelming 
Japanese assault; the proposal to develop a base 
to be used by the American navy meant the 
land force was to be doubled and committed 
to the defence of the harbour; after the arrival 
of 24 Squadron the troops were to defend the 
airfields of the ‘forward air observation line’; and 
when the airmen withdrew, the 1400 men of 
Lark Force faced the Japanese landing simply as, 
the Australian government brutally conceded, 
‘hostages to fortune’.119 The Australians had no 
capacity to reinforce, supply or withdraw them, 
or rescue those who survived the overwhelming 
Japanese assault on 23 January 1942.
The Australians had three decades of warning 
about the possible inability of Britain hard-
pressed in Europe to send a major naval force to 
the Pacific, the chances of an opportunistic Japan 
advancing south, and the possible ineffectiveness 
of the Singapore base to deter the Japanese. 
In the event, it was not just that the Japanese 
took Singapore in a week after their landing on 
the north of the island, but that Singapore was 
almost irrelevant. The Japanese captured Rabaul 
on 23 January, before the Japanese had even 
reached the south of the Malay Peninsula and 
over three weeks before the fall of Singapore. By 
its location, a strong Singapore might have been 
an excellent base to stop the Japanese advancing 
into the Indian Ocean and attacking British 
interests in Burma, India and Ceylon. But it was 
simply not a barrier between the Australian and 
Japanese mandated territories. For Singapore to 
have been effective in the defence of Australia it 
had to be known to be strong, able to withstand 
the reality of an assault, and service a combined 
air and sea force that could operate many miles to 
the east. Singapore was none of these.
By January 1942 the Australians had a defence 
strategy that they knew was ineffective. Their 
trained forces were in Europe and the Middle 
East; they were dependent on a Britain that could 
not help; they had begun to turn to an America 
that was not yet ready to help; they had not 
developed forces appropriate to home defence; 
and they had distributed over 27,000 men and 
women to the north, many in small forces 
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on Ambon, Timor, Papua and New Guinea, 
and all beyond Australia’s capacity to support 
or relieve. Of those men and women, 23,000 
became prisoners and over 2000 were killed in 
losing battles.120 While white women (other 
than missionaries and nurses) and children were 
evacuated from Papua and New Guinea, some 
500 foreign civilians died in Papua and New 
Guinea. About 250 of them were missionaries, 
and the Australian government officers also 
suffered high losses. In New Guinea six heads of 
government departments and eight of the fifteen 
members of the legislative council died.121 Only 
on Timor and Bougainville and inland from Lae 
and Salamuau did the Australians fight the sort 
of war that their own experts (and many civilians 
with common sense) told them they should 
fight: make a brief stand against the landing 
force, withdraw, observe, report, and mount the 
occasional guerrilla attack. In January 1942 the 
Australians were unprepared; they were certainly 
not surprised.
On 23 January 1942, the day that the Japanese 
occupied Rabaul, Dr H.V.Evatt, Minister for 
External Affairs, in the absence of Curtin, 
inserted in a cable to Churchill that ‘after all the 
assurances’ Australia had been given a decision 
not to reinforce but to evacuate Singapore would 
be seen as an ‘inexcusable betrayal’.122 As Earle 
Page, the Australian representative in London, 
reported, Churchill ‘went off the deep end’; 
and since then there has been debate about 
whether Australia was ‘betrayed’ over Singapore. 
There are two parts to the debate that are 
sometimes confused. The first is the immediate 
question whether Evatt at that time and in those 
circumstances should have chosen those words. 
With the limited information that he had, the 
few people consulted and the likely response 
to his language, Evatt should have spoken less 
aggressively. The second is the broader issue of 
whether Australia was betrayed by the British 
over the Singapore strategy. Australia was 
certainly misled. Given the wording of some of 
the British communications and the positions 
held by the authors, it is also difficult to believe 
that the Australians were not deliberately misled. 
At the same time it has to be said that the 
British were fighting desperately for their own 
survival, and the fact that they diverted any 
resources to Singapore was remarkable. The 
Australians should have had more confidence in 
their own assessments, and their late demands for 
the reinforcement of Singapore only forced the 
surrender and suffering of more troops. It could 
be argued that the Australians were complicit in 
their own betrayal, but they were betrayed.123
THE LAST DOMINO
By 1945 Australians believed that the battles 
of a world war had confirmed the importance 
of New Guinea in the defence of Australia: the 
Japanese had established their bases in New 
Guinea; the southward advance of the Japanese 
had been stopped in the land, sea and air 
battles of New Guinea and the Solomons; and 
Australians and Papuans and New Guineans 
had formed a new relationship, manifest in the 
images of the Fuzzy Wuzzy angels and the Pacific 
Islands Regiment.124 The immediate assumption 
was that Australians would commit more of their 
defence effort to New Guinea. Thomas White, 
who had served Australia in two wars and been 
a minister in the Lyons Government, told the 
House of Representatives:
New Guinea will always be an important 
place from a strategic point of view, and 
no doubt after the war we shall have to 
garrison it with troops, lay down air-ﬁelds 
and make other provision which will 
enable the Navy, the Army, and the Air 
Force to operate from that region instead 
of being wholly based in Australia.125
It was as though Australia had to make up for 
the inadequacies of 1942, and Australia was not 
now inhibited by the conditions of the League 
of Nations mandate. Under the trusteeship 
agreement with the United Nations, Australia 
had the same power to legislate for the defence 
of New Guinea as it did for mainland.126 But 
in the postwar Australia did not direct men or 
materiel to Papua and New Guinea, and much of 
the infrastructure of war soon deteriorated or was 
recycled into the makeshift postwar buildings of 
Port Moresby, Lae, Rabaul and other centres. For 
the next thirty years the metal strips of Marsden 
matting that had once converted grass airstrips 
into all-weather airfields reappeared in fencing, 
guards on road bends, and buildings.
The strategic importance of Papua New 
Guinea remained fixed in Australian minds, but 
the immediate threat of invasion from the north 
had declined sharply. In the Pacific, the United 
States was dominant at sea and in the air, and 
it had taken over the Micronesian Territories of 
Japan. With Micronesia designated a strategic 
area, the Americans were given authority to 
fortify the islands and the United Nations could 
not end or change American authority under the 
trusteeship agreement. Across the horizon from 
New Guinea were now the protective bases of an 
ally and superpower, not the bases of a potential 
enemy. Briefly, the Australians thought American 
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power might extend south of the equator. As the 
Australian postwar civil administration gradually 
took control from the Australian New Guinea 
Administrative Unit, its field officers encountered 
some 2000 Americans still stationed on the vast 
naval base on Manus. Eighteen months earlier 
Seeadler Harbour had been one of the biggest 
bases in the Pacific, rivalling Pearl Harbour, and 
the assembly point for much of the push north 
to the Philippines.127 The Americans on the 
base resisted coming under Australian control, 
and at the same time the American government 
asked that their forces might retain use of the 
base. The Australian Department of Defence 
supported allowing the Americans to stay, but 
the conditions imposed by the Americans who 
wanted exclusive use of the base whenever they 
wanted it but for the Australians to maintain 
it at other times, were not acceptable to the 
Australians. Also, American interest in the base 
may have been declining as fast as the climate 
and salvage teams were degrading the rapidly 
built facilities: the Americans decided they had 
enough bases north of the equator.128 Later, the 
Liberal Party opposition would berate the Chifley 
government for failing to keep the Americans 
in Manus, but John Dedman, a minister in the 
Curtin government and Minister for Defence 
1946-49, has argued that the Americans’ terms 
would have been equally unacceptable to the 
Liberals, and American budget cuts made it 
unlikely that they would have stayed. They did 
not retain rights to bases in British Guadalcanal, 
New Zealand Samoa or French Noumea.129 Evatt 
had hoped to bind the United States to the 
southwest Pacific through a Pacific pact, but it 
was his successor, Percy Spender, Minister for 
External Affairs in the Menzies Government, 
who successfully negotiated the ANZUS Treaty 
in 1951. This, Australia hoped, meant that in 
the event of an armed attack on one nation ‘or 
on the island territories under its jurisdiction in 
the Pacific’ then the others ‘would act to meet 
the common danger’.130 
As Australians looked north in the immediate 
postwar, they could reasonably believe that they 
had obtained security for at least a generation. 
Germany was no longer a threat and Japan’s 
military might was destroyed and its rebuilding 
curtailed by the Japanese constitution and, more 
significantly, by the Japanese acceptance, even 
embrace, of pacifisms. No Asian nation had the 
capacity to transport the land strength of its 
armies across oceans, and in any case the United 
States naval and air forces were dominant in the 
Pacific and had a secure hold over the islands 
and the island military bases to the immediate 
north of New Guinea. Although conscious of 
their dependence on the United States, the 
Australians were still committed to Britain. In 
1950 Spender in a major review of Australian 
foreign policy said, ‘the head and corner stone 
of the British Commonwealth is the United 
Kingdom, and … our security is to a large extent 
dependent upon its strength and influence in 
world affairs’.131 The British connection was 
then based on both sentiment and reality: the 
British were then still in Malaya, Singapore and 
Borneo to the northwest, and in the Solomons, 
New Hebrides and Fiji on the east. The formal 
commitment of the United States and Britain 
to the security of the region was realised in 1954 
with the formation of the South East Asian 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO).132
In the postwar, it was when the Australians 
looked west from Port Moresby or Wewak that 
they saw danger. The threat was global and local. 
Spender explained that the ‘ultimate objective’ 
of the Soviet Union was a ‘universal form of 
Communism with Moscow as the controlling 
centre’.133 China was Communist, and while 
it was uncertain how China would behave, it 
could ‘foment disaffection and disorder’ beyond 
its borders through the many Chinese living 
overseas and the strong Communist parties and 
unrest in Southeast Asia. Spender warned:
Should the forces of communism prevail 
and Vietnam come under the heel of 
Communist China, Malaya is in danger 
of being outﬂanked and it together with 
Thailand, Burma and Indonesia, will 
become the next direct object of further 
Communist activities.134
In simplistic terms, this was unified 
Communism on a world mission and the countries 
of Southeast Asia were in danger of falling like 
dominoes.
When he came to consider New Guinea, 
Spender repeated long held beliefs that were 
thought to have been confirmed in the recent war: 
the islands were the ‘last ring of defence against 
aggression’ and New Guinea was an ‘absolutely 
essential link in the chain of Australian defence’. 
Spender asserted that Australia had an interest 
in events in all of the island of New Guinea, 
and should any change take place in the west, 
Australia might not ‘adopt a purely passive role’. 
Although guarded in what he said, there was no 
doubting Spender’s meaning. The Republic of the 
United States of Indonesia had been proclaimed 
in December 1949, but the Netherlands had 
retained control of West New Guinea, its fate 
to be determined by negotiations between the 
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Netherlands and Indonesia. Spender was making 
it clear that Australia had a direct interest in 
what happened in West New Guinea, and he 
implied what he had already said in Cabinet: 
Australia opposed the transfer of West New 
Guinea to Indonesia. Spender also suggested to 
his cabinet colleagues that Australia might try to 
join the Dutch in a joint administration, perhaps 
as joint trustees.135 As Spender and many other 
Australians saw the world, if Indonesia held 
West New Guinea Australia would share a long 
land border with a new, turbulent, unpredictable 
nation of 70,000,000, and if the Indonesian 
domino fell then international Communism and 
the Cold War had reached that porous border. 
Acting on the assumption that Australia had 
a right to a voice in the negotiations between 
Indonesia and the Dutch over West New Guinea, 
Spender told the Dutch, British and Americans 
of Australia’s ‘vital interest’ and that it was 
ready to play a ‘more positive role’.136 When in 
April 1950 it looked as though the Dutch were 
likely to leave West New Guinea, Spender went 
further saying clearly that Australia could not 
accept Indonesian control and if the Dutch 
thought they should leave then it was better 
they hand authority to Australia to administer 
West New Guinea ‘along with the Territory of 
Papua and the trust Territory of New Guinea’.137 
The Americans and the British quickly told 
the Australians to leave negotiations to the 
Dutch and the Indonesians, and that any direct 
Australian intervention was likely to make the 
issue more complicated.138 The Dutch decided 
to stay in West New Guinea, making Australia’s 
strong stand irrelevant. Through most of the 
rest of the 1950s the Australians encouraged 
the Dutch to stay, argued against the Indonesian 
claims at international meetings, supported the 
idea of keeping the dispute in ‘cold storage’ so 
that the status quo might endure, and attempted 
to isolate the West New Guinea issue from the 
rest of their relationship with Indonesia.139 
Strangely, the thought that they might share 
a long land border with a turbulent nation, and 
even that international communism might reach 
the border, did not persuade Australians to build 
substantial bases or fortifications in the east. 
The Pacific Islands Regiment was reactivated in 
1951, again as a unit of the Australian army with 
Australian officers and specialist servicemen, but 
ten years later there were still fewer than 700 
Papua New Guineans in the unit.
THE INDONESIAN BORDER
By 1960 Australian policy towards, and 
perception of, West New Guinea had changed. 
Indonesia’s armed forces had increased in 
strength and possessed advanced equipment 
(their Soviet-supplied aircraft and ships were 
superior to Australia’s); and the power of the PKI, 
the Indonesian Communist party, had grown, 
and in Laos and Vietnam the Communists were 
advancing. Australia no longer felt able to make 
dogmatic statements and no longer demanded 
a voice in any settlement. The Minister for 
External Affairs, Richard Casey, personally less 
belligerent than Spender, assured the Indonesians 
that Australia would accept an agreement reached 
freely and peacefully by the Indonesians and the 
Dutch.140 In a long paper prepared while Casey 
was Minister but presented to Cabinet after he 
resigned, the Department of External Affairs set 
out what it thought Australia should do.141 It 
should encourage the Dutch to stay in West New 
Guinea and use all means short of force to stop 
Indonesia gaining control. But neither of these 
policies were to be pursued if they prejudiced 
relationships with the United States and Britain, 
and an earlier Cabinet note of January 1959 had 
to be kept in mind: ‘the strategic importance of 
Indonesia is of greater importance to the United 
States and to Australia than Netherlands New 
Guinea’.142 West New Guinea was important to 
Australian security, but not the most important. 
If the Dutch stayed then Australia should 
‘envisage, facilitate and encourage ultimate 
voluntary political association of the East and 
West New Guinea people’. If the Dutch decided 
to leave then Australia should ‘seek a maximum 
voice’ in the administration of the West and 
‘keep open the possibility of ultimate unification 
of New Guinea’. 
Among the many problems faced by the 
Australians should they adopt the policy proposed 
by the Department of External Affairs was the fact 
that they could not publicly announce what they 
wanted. To advocate the union of New Guinea 
would have antagonised the Indonesians and 
any suggestion of Australia extending its control 
west would have raised the suspicions of the ex-
colonial powers in the United Nations. All the 
Australians could have done was keep asserting 
that the people of West New Guinea should have 
the right to self-determination, and that there 
should be increased cooperation between the 
Dutch and the Australian administrations. The 
Department of External Affairs paper thought 
Australia might – at best – have fifteen or so 
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years of Dutch rule to gradually ‘promote a 
popular sense of geographic and racial unity’. 
Cabinet was not persuaded to pursue the 
vision of a united New Guinea. Paul Hasluck, 
Minister for Territories, was unenthusiastic, and 
thought that if there was to be Melanesian unity 
then it should start by bringing the Australian 
territories and the British Solomons together.143 
Cabinet reaffirmed its policy: Australia would 
accept a settlement negotiated between Holland 
and Indonesia, it would not use force to assist the 
Dutch, and relations with Indonesia, the USA 
and Britain were all of greater strategic importance 
than the fate of West New Guinea. And those 
priorities were quickly put to the test with 
Sukarno making increasingly bellicose threats, 
and infiltrators and paratroopers landing on West 
New Guinea. Without allies, the Dutch had no 
choice but to accept the conditions of the New 
York Agreement; and West New Guinea passed 
to the United Nations Temporary Executive 
Authority, then rapidly to the Indonesians in 
1963 with the face-saving proviso of an act of 
free-choice for the West New Guineans – by then 
West Irianese – in 1969. 
The border between west and east New 
Guinea that had been indistinctly marked 
and little patrolled, now became one of the 
significant arbitrary land borders in the world. 
It was where Indonesia and Southeast Asia 
ended and the Australian territories and Oceania 
began; the border that had once divided people 
of a common culture was becoming increasingly 
a dividing line between cultures – lingua francas, 
religions, and government and bureaucratic styles. 
Almost every year from 1969 there have been 
incidents – refugees crossing the border or being 
repatriated, and Indonesian troops pursuing or 
firing at alleged guerrillas or accidentally crossing 
the border. As Indonesian strengths and policies 
were – in Australian eyes – less predictable than 
the Dutch, Australia could be less confident that 
a potential enemy would not obtain a base in 
the west of New Guinea. If that was true, then 
Australia’s argument for holding the east of the 
island had weakened.
PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S 
INDEPENDENCE: AUSTRALIA’S 
SECURITY
During the 1960s Australia was obviously 
increasing the pace of political development in 
Papua New Guinea, but it was not until 1968 
that Australia made it clear that Papua and New 
Guinea were to be treated as one. Both were on 
the road to self-government, and while some 
‘special relationship’ with Australia might be 
worked out in future, Papua New Guinea was not 
going to be a state of the Commonwealth. By 1971 
Australia’s stated goal was independence and the 
timetable for full internal self-government had 
shortened. Whichever party was in government 
in Australia, power was to be transferred 
sometime in the life of the House of Assembly 
elected early in 1972.144 While there were Papua 
New Guineans who advocated self-government 
and ‘home rule’ had been a central plank of 
the Pangu Pati, independence had not been an 
issue at the 1968 or 1972 elections: much of the 
initiative to establish the independent nation of 
Papua New Guinea had come from Australia. 
The island ‘ramparts’, the area that had been 
proclaimed ‘vital’ to Australian defence through 
ninety years, were to be set free.
Australia’s readiness to abandon a basic 
assumption about its own security came from 
a general review of defence policies and from 
particular developments within Papua New 
Guinea. This was a time of the withdrawal 
of the troops from Vietnam, already underway 
before Gough Whitlam came to power in 1972; 
a reduction in Australian forces in Singapore 
and Malaya and an indication that even more 
would be coming home; and for the first time 
since the Australians went into action in Korea 
in 1950 it looked likely that no Australians 
would be deployed in operations to the north. 
This was a time of no major threat for ten – even 
fifteen – years. With the fading of the menace of 
Germany, Japan and international communism, 
this was the first time since the Empire had 
announced the acquisition of British New Guinea 
that Australia had no identifiable enemies with 
the capacity to endanger the continent. Even in 
the remote possibility of a major conflict, inter-
continental missiles and submarine launch pads 
reduced the utility of island harbours. Australian 
defence planners began to talk of increased self-
reliance, of ensuring the defence forces were 
designed to act in Australian interests, and policy 
was not to be based on the assumption that 
Australian forces were to be ‘sent abroad to fight 
as part of some other nation’s forces’.145 Reduced 
to slogans, this was the change from ‘forward’ 
to ‘continental’ defence. The vocabulary used 
by Australians about the place of Papua New 
Guinea in their defence changed from ‘vital’ and 
‘essential’ to ‘abiding’ and then linked Papua 
New Guinea with other neighbouring countries 
that were of ‘close concern’.146 In Australia’s 
broad planning, there was as much concern about 
  Fighting for Her Gates and Waterways: Changing Perceptions of New Guinea in Australian Defence
20
obligations to defend Papua New Guinea before 
and immediately after independence as there 
was about the place of Papua New Guinea in the 
defence of Australia.147
Australia’s broad strategic assessment allowed 
it to leave Papua New Guinea: developments 
within Papua New Guinea told those Australians 
concerned with defence that they should go. 
In 1972 there was still a high dependence on 
Australians in Papua New Guinea’s armed services. 
In the police there were seventy-seven Papua 
New Guinean and 171 overseas commissioned 
officers. Of the forty-eight police stations spread 
through Papua New Guinea just eleven were 
commanded by Papua New Guineans, and at 
police headquarters there were fifty-two overseas 
officers and eleven Papua New Guineans.148 In the 
army, soon to be part of the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force, there were over 600 Australians in 
a total force of 3,436, the Australians being most 
significant as officers and in positions requiring 
specialist skills.149 If the armed services were to 
use force within Papua New Guinea then the 
civilian authorities and most senior commanders 
would be Australian – that was inescapable until 
Australia discharged its obligations to the United 
Nations for its New Guinea trusteeship – but so 
would many of the support and field officers. For 
an Australian commanded force to shoot down 
significant numbers of Papua New Guineans 
in the international climate of the early 1970s 
would have resulted in a wave of public revulsion 
within Australia and opprobrium across the 
globe. It would have been extremely damaging 
to Australia’s standing in the region, especially 
among the numerous ex-colonies; it would have 
diminished Australia’s capacity to ensure a 
peaceful transition of Papua New Guinea from 
territories to nation; and it might have led to 
reaction and increasing entanglement.
In the early 1970s there was every chance 
that Australians would be required to use force. 
At the end 1971, Les Johnson, the Australian 
Administrator in Port Moresby, wrote to the 
Minister: ‘there has been a growing disregard 
for the established law and those administering 
it, which has resulted in a substantial increase 
of violent crime’.150 He was conscious of the 
growing numbers of raskols, barred windows, 
electronic alarms and fences in the towns and 
the resurgent tribal warfare in the Highlands. 
Local Courts in the Highlands heard 22,380 
cases in the year 1971-1972 involving offences 
against public order, a 25% increase over the 
previous year.151 In 1972 in reported incidents 
of rioting involving more than fifty people in 
the Western Highlands eighteen were killed, 
282 injured, and ten times the police had used 
firearms or tear gas.152 Although the violence 
was in a remote area and under-reported in the 
press, it was clearly on a scale that the Australian 
administration could not ignore, but to reimpose 
the central government’s authority was likely to 
lead to confrontation. It was not going to be like 
the earlier ‘pacification’; already government 
field officers were complaining of open defiance 
‘virtually unheard of in the early 1960s’.153
From 1969, the Mataungan Association on 
the Gazelle Peninsula was demonstrating its 
capacity to bring together crowds of over 20,000 
to protest against Australian policies and make 
demands for land. The government had to call out 
over 1000 police to ‘protect property and support 
the legally-established council’.154 In July 1970 
when John Gorton addressed a crowd in Rabaul 
‘he became probably the first … Australian Prime 
Minister who felt it necessary to carry a revolver 
to a public meeting’.155 Soon after Gorton’s return 
to Australia, David Hay, the Administrator in 
Port Moresby, believing the situation on the 
Gazelle to be ‘tense and explosive’, formally 
asked for authority to call out the Pacific Islands 
Regiment to support the police.156 After some 
negotiation in which the Minister for the Defence, 
Malcolm Fraser, initially opposed the request, the 
Governor-General signed the approval.157 When 
Les Johnson replaced Hay as Administrator the 
threat of violence was still high and Johnson 
wrote himself an undated authority to call out 
the army:
From reports received by me today from 
Rabaul I am satisﬁed that a confrontation 
or serious incident has occurred which 
in my judgment threatens or shows loss 
of control of the situation by the police. 
I therefore requisition such military 
forces as you consider to be necessary for 
the maintenance of public peace in the 
Gazelle Peninsula and in the Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea.158
On Bougainville the secessionist movement 
clearly expressed the will of many people on the 
island, and it gathered strength by articulating 
opposition to the Panguna copper mine. The only 
possible response of the Australian administration 
was, as Johnson said of the Mataungan movement, 
‘a continuation of a policy of containment until 
a national Papua New Guinea Government 
inherited this legacy of colonialism’.159 That was 
what the Australian administration managed 
to do, but senior officials knew that they were 
close to the mistake, deliberate political ploy or 
mass emotion that transformed a crowd into a 
rampaging mob, a hail of reactive gunfire and an 
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intractable round of violence. The fact that the 
independent government of Papua New Guinea 
eventually faced a ten year war on Bougainville 
demonstrated the strength of one movement that 
had to be contained or accommodated.
On the Indonesian border the refugees, the 
operations of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka), 
Indonesian demands for the right to cross the 
border in ‘hot pursuit’ and the proximity of Papua 
New Guinean civil and army patrols were always 
likely to lead to unplanned violence. In 1968 the 
Minister for External Territories, Charles Barnes, 
explained what had happened when Indonesian 
troops chased refugees to Wutung village just on 
the Australian side of the border: ‘During the 
incursion, the Indonesian party fired shots at the 
Officer-in-Charge of Wutung Patrol Post, Mr 
A.Troy, two native constables and the station 
interpreter, none of whom were armed. It also 
appeared that the party conducted a house-to-
house search of a Wutung hamlet’.160 Given the 
reports of violence in Irian Jaya, the presence of 
armed patrols commanded by Australians near 
the border and the frequent border crossings  the 
chances of an ‘incident’, even an ‘international 
incident’ poisoning relations between Australia 
and Indonesia, were high.
By the early 1970s, then, the importance of 
fixed land bases in a major conflict had declined, 
there seemed no definable external threat to 
either Australia or Papua New Guinea, and if 
Australia stayed in Papua New Guinea then it 
risked being embroiled in violence that would 
damage its record as a colonial power, diminish its 
international standing and leave an independent 
Papua New Guinea with a peace to be brokered 
and maintained. In terms of Australia’s interests 
in its own security, Australia could leave, and 
there were reasons why it should.
SECURITY AND RE-ENGAGEMENT
Through the 1980s Australia continued to 
assert that an independent Papua New Guinea 
was strategically important to Australia. Paul 
Dibb in his review of defence in 1986 wrote 
that if a ‘potentially hostile power’ gained 
military bases in Papua New Guinea ‘this would 
have direct and important implications for our 
security interests’.161 But consistent with his 
belief that Australia had at least ten years before 
the development of a substantial threat, Dibb 
argued that there would a long warning time 
before any power with the capacity to threaten 
Australia established itself in Papua New Guinea. 
The 1991 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade simply said ‘Papua New 
Guinea’s strategic importance for Australia has 
remained axiomatic’ and it quoted a Department 
of Defence submission, confirming the danger of 
an enemy in full or partial control of Papua New 
Guinea.162 But by then developments within 
Papua New Guinea were thought to raise the 
most immediate security questions.163
When Australians first speculated about 
the possible declining capacity of the Papua 
New Guinea government to assert its authority, 
they were worried that if Papua New Guinea 
could not secure its border with Indonesia then 
guerrilla forces would be more likely to exploit 
the area and Indonesian troops would feel a 
greater need to cross the border and be more 
able to justify violating Papua New Guinea’s 
sovereignty by pointing out that it could not 
tolerate a neighbour providing refuge for enemies 
of Indonesia. In the worst case, this could have 
led to a progressive domination of and beyond 
the border by Indonesia. But Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea have not allowed many minor 
incidents to damage their overall relationship. 
They signed a Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship 
and Co-operation in 1987, and changes within 
the Indonesian state and negotiations leading 
to a more autonomous Papua in the west have 
reduced concern that it is an inability to police 
the border that endangers Papua New Guinea’s 
security.
The war on Bougainville, beginning with the 
explosions sabotaging the power to the Panguna 
mine in 1988, sharpened concerns about internal 
security. The 1991 Joint Committee decided that 
‘Australia’s security interest in Papua New Guinea 
may need to focus on … the internal threat, as 
opposed to any increasingly unlikely external 
threat’.164 The Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
proved to be poorly supplied, ineffective in 
operations and was accused of human rights 
violations. The use of four Australian-supplied 
Iroquois helicopters in apparently indiscriminate 
firing on civilian targets further complicated the 
issue of the appropriateness of Australian aid to 
the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.165 The 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade told the 
Joint Committee:
Australia has a strategic interest in 
the unity of Papua New Guinea, the 
maintenance of the authority of the central 
government, the restoration of law and 
order on Bougainville and the continuing 
viability of the existing and (potential) 
substantial investment in the Papua New 
Guinea economy.166
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At the time of the Sandline crisis in 1997 
the Papua New Guinea state was severely tested. 
Brigadier General Jerry Singirok led the movement 
to arrest the Sandline mercenaries contracted to 
prosecute the war on Bougainville, went on radio 
and demanded that the Government of Sir Julius 
Chan resign. Rioting and looting broke out in 
Port Moresby, and crowds (including armed 
soldiers) surrounded parliament house. As Sean 
Dorney, the experienced journalist, said, ‘Chaos 
reigned in the streets outside Murray barracks’ and 
the firing of teargas and other weapons could be 
heard.167 Australian contingency planners should 
then have been considering if Australia would 
intervene to defend a democratically elected 
government and, if so, what force, alone or in 
concert with other powers and with what rules 
of engagement, should be sent to Port Moresby. 
They might have also have been wondering 
whether they would have to intervene if mobs 
shifted from looting and minor violence to major 
violence. In Papua New Guinea, restraint by army 
officers, compromise by politicians, the expulsion 
of the mercenaries and the absence of leaders 
with clear plans averted crisis. But the ‘sentinel 
islands’ had become the ‘arc of instability’.168
Within the United States there has been 
repetition that the events in New York and 
Washington on 11 September 2001 changed world 
security: the nature of the threat, and the means 
to identify and oppose it were all transformed. 
The rhetoric of international relations changed 
with the need to eliminate terrorism the ready 
rationalisation for intervention in the affairs of 
other countries. The pre-emptive strike could be 
justified: what had been the sanctity of sovereignty 
became the agnosticism of sovereignty.169 The 
lessons of 11 September 2001, reinforced by the 
Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, certainly 
influenced Australian assessments of its own 
security and its relations with the region. This 
was most obvious in the Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute’s Beyond Bali: ASPI’s strategic 
assessment 2002.170 It began with the assertion 
that ‘Terrorism is now a major security problem 
for Australia’ and it rated the chances of a 
terrorist attack on Australia as ‘high’.171 When 
the ‘assessment’ came to consider the region it 
claimed: ‘Three of our closest neighbours – Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu – are in different ways struggling to 
survive as functioning nations and societies. 
The Solomon Islands is the furthest down the 
road to state failure, but PNG and Vanuatu also 
face serious problems.’ The ASPI report argued 
that Australia had a humanitarian concern for 
the peoples of the islands and the long term 
strategic need to keep possible enemies from the 
area, but now the islands were ‘potential havens 
for terrorist groups’ and could ‘serve as bases for 
groups planning attacks in Australia’. In fact 
‘we risk seeing our neighbourhood degenerate 
into lawless badlands, ruled more by criminals 
than by legitimate governments’.172 Others have 
added that the islands were allowing the growth 
of transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, 
gun smuggling, illegal immigration and money 
laundering.173 While the ASPI assessment has 
been seen as a blunt statement of the degree of 
decline in government efficiency and authority 
in the Pacific and an overstatement of the 
association of the islands with international 
terrorism, it was influential in quickening 
and justifying Australia’s part in the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands in 
2003 and the Enhanced Cooperation Program 
to Papua New Guinea. And significantly in their 
re-engagement the Australians have invested 
heavily in the police and the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force. As assessments of their 
defence interests were important in causing the 
Australian colonies to try to assert their control 
to the north in 1883 and 1884, Australia to take 
over the administration of Papua in 1906 and 
New Guinea in1914, and Australia to withdraw 
in 1975, they were also significant in their return 
in 2003 and 2004. 
CONCLUSION
Obviously, concern for security has not 
been the only factor determining an Australian 
government presence in Papua New Guinea; 
but it has always been important and at critical 
times often dominant. In 130 years there have 
been consistencies and change in Australia’s 
perception of the place of the islands in Australia’s 
defence. The consistency has been that the 
Australians have always worried about a hostile 
nation gaining a hold in the islands from which 
it could cut Australian lines of communication, 
raid Australian coasts and eventually mount 
a major assault on Australia. The changes 
have been substantial. The initial fear was of a 
European power gaining an island colony and 
then being engaged in war with Britain, resulting 
in Australia having an enemy at the door. That 
overlapped with and was overwhelmed by the 
prediction that Japan would take advantage of 
Britain’s forces being committed to war in Europe 
to occupy the islands and attack Australia. From 
the 1950s, it seemed that the unstable ex-colonies 
of Southeast Asia would be the dominoes falling 
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at the push of international communism, and 
Sukarno’s Indonesia could allow the last domino 
to fall halfway across New Guinea. By the 1970s 
the big threats had gone and the Australians, 
thinking they were in danger of being entangled 
in conflicts within Papua New Guinea and on 
the Indonesian border, withdrew. In the twenty-
first century Australians decided that their 
homeland was under threat from international 
terrorists who might exploit the lawless islands 
to damage Australia. Through the first seventy 
years, Australian perceptions of who they were 
and who their enemies might be were often 
expressed in terms of race, often simply and 
bluntly identifying themselves and potential allies 
and enemies by colour. This was most stark in the 
1920s. Race was then significant as the defining 
characteristic of Australianness and of Australian 
enemies. Race was still important but declining 
in 1950, rapidly disappearing in the 1960s and 
almost gone in the 1970s. Consciousness of race 
and racism continued in Australia, but the extent 
of the transformation of the rhetoric and much of 
the reality was unpredictable, even unthinkable 
for many Australians, in 1942.
Australians’ changing perceptions are obvious 
in their various expectations of Papua New 
Guineans in the armed forces. Colonel Kenneth 
Mackay thought thousands of them could 
be trained to defend Australia against Asian 
invasion; but it took more than thirty years before 
Papuans were enlisted in an infantry battalion. 
At the same time, Australians could not bring 
themselves to arm New Guineans. They had less 
confidence in the ability of New Guineans, and 
the police had been leaders of the Rabaul strike, 
the one moment of organised defiance against 
the Australians in the Mandated Territory. By 
the end of the war the Pacific Islands Regiment, 
then recruited from across the Territory, was one 
of the most distinguished units in the Australian 
army. At their final parade a newspaper reporter 
said that, ‘The splendid bearing of the island 
soldiers and the precision of their movements was 
inspiring to the military audience…. [They] had 
proved themselves loyal comrades and gallant 
fighting men’.174 But there was no place for them 
in postwar Papua New Guinea, and the last of the 
four battalions was disbanded in 1947. Spender 
announced that the Pacific Islands Regiment was 
to be reformed at the same time as he warned 
of the rise of international communism and 
just before Australia committed troops to the 
Korean War. It was expanded in numbers and 
functions in the early 1960s and directed to the 
border in the early 1960s as the Indonesians 
confronted Malaysia and replaced the Dutch in 
West New Guinea.175 As with other institutions, 
the Australians were late and rushed in their 
promotion of Papua New Guineans to senior 
positions. No Papua New Guineans were trained 
as officers until two were commissioned in 1963 
and in 1973 when the PIR became the Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), it was still 
commanded by an Australian. At independence 
there were over 200 Australian officers and many 
other specialist non-commissioned officers in 
the PNGDF. In 1980, the PNGDF appeared to 
demonstrate that it was an efficient force when it 
was used in the suppression of the Jimmy Stevens 
rebellion in Vanuatu, an assignment that would 
have been diplomatically, and perhaps tactically, 
difficult for Australians. After the weaknesses in 
the PNGDF were made clear on Bougainville, 
Australians in the early 1990s commented 
on budget cuts, deteriorating equipment, 
‘politicisation of the senior ranks’, failures 
when used in domestic security, ‘breakdowns 
in discipline’ and ‘deteriorating morale’.176 The 
PNGDF had become part of the problems of 
internal security and a target in the aid directed 
to institutional strengthening. It was a long way 
from the empire soldiers envisaged a hundred 
years before, the force that was going to protect 
white Australia from Asian invasion.
Given the difficulty of predicting international 
relations over long periods and the hysteria that 
can overwhelm rational analysis, it is surprising 
that Australians twice got the threat right. 
In 1914 Australia had an enemy at the door 
and in 1942 the Japanese launched an attack. 
Australians may also have got the reasons to 
withdraw in 1975 right: it is difficult to see 
how they could have dealt effectively and non-
violently with the war on Bougainville and the 
various challenges to law and order in the towns 
and the Highlands. But the fact that Australia 
had accurate assessments of the danger did not 
mean that it was ready to respond. It knew 
little about German New Guinea in 1914, not 
even where the wireless communication centre 
was, and it did not have a force ready to go 
north to occupy German Micronesia. In 1942 
Australia was not only ill-prepared but it had 
the wrong forces, they were wrongly deployed, 
and initially most used the wrong tactics. The 
poverty of Australia’s initial response to the 
mounting Japanese menace and early landings 
was largely because Australia knew that when 
facing an enemy of that magnitude it had to have 
a strong ally, but by committing itself to an ally it 
weakened its capacity for self-defence.
From the 1880s Australia often had aspirations 
beyond its capacity to realise them. Australia 
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wanted an arc of islands from Fiji to New 
Guinea that was either controlled or influenced 
by Australia. At various times, the Australians 
enquired about buying or negotiating a transfer 
of control of those islands outside their authority, 
but there was no chance of France handing New 
Caledonia to Australia, and negotiations with 
the British never passed beyond the preliminary 
stages. In any case, Australia did not have the 
military might to defend the islands in a major 
conflict. Australia knew that without the help 
of an ally who responded quickly, any garrisoned 
island posts would be abandoned as Australian 
forces were needed to protect the mainland. 
Once it became clear that the Dutch were 
unlikely to stay in the East Indies, the Australians 
thought they might administer West New Guinea 
as owner or as sole or joint trustee. That would 
have allowed for the eventual union of east and 
west New Guinea, and anyone looking at the 
map of the region would agree that the arbitrary 
division of New Guinea was undesirable. The 
dilemma for Australia was that if they were to 
advocate one New Guinea nation then that was 
less likely to happen.177 From the foundation of 
the independent nation of Indonesia, Australians 
recognized that their relations with Indonesia, 
soon to have a population of 200,000,000 and 
influential in Southeast Asia, the non-aligned 
nations and the Islamic world, were more 
important than any attempt to assert an influence 
in the islands west of the 153rd meridian.178 Also, 
Australia accepted that it was not in its self-
interest to act in the region either in defiance of 
the United States or without regional partners.
For Australia, the problem has always been to 
match aim with power, to make its policies and 
its armed forces consistent with the best available 
assessments of threat, and to work in concert with 
regional powers and at least one major power. So 
far, Australians have been reasonable at analysis, 
poor at preparing to meet the identified danger, 
and not too bad at the late scramble to deal with 
the threatening disaster.
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